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Neither Herald nor Fanfare: the Limited Impact of the ECHR Act 2003 on 
Rights Infrastructure in Ireland 
 
Fiona de Londras 
Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Human Rights Centre, Durham University 
 
With neither herald nor fanfare, the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 
entered into force on 31 December 2003 and so, after decades of discussion, the 
European Convention on Human Rights had become transposed into Irish law and 
capable of use—through the prism of the Act—in domestic litigation.  
 
It is well known that the Act has had nothing close to the impact of its close cousin 
the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom.
1
 Nor has it attracted the vitriol 
and political attention directed to that Act.
2
 Rather it has slid quietly and somewhat 
unspectacularly onto the statute books and into the legal system. More than ten years 
after it came into force it is opportune to ask what, if any, impact the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 has actually had in Ireland.  
 
I start by outlining the purpose of the Act and very briefly sketching its core elements 
and structure. I then assess the extent to which the Act might be said to have 
succeeded in achieving its core stated purpose: the domestication of the Convention in 
Ireland. In this respect I argue that the Act has been underwhelming, not only because 
of its design and content but also because of how it has been used in judicial and 
political processes.  
 
Having proposed a number of practical reforms that might help to ameliorate some of 
these weaknesses I close by considering what appears to have been the secondary 
purpose of the Act: the provision of an equivalence of rights protection between 
                                                 
1
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 The future of the Human Rights Act 1998 is very much uncertain. The Conservative Party seems 
committed to replacing it with something else—possibly a ‘UK Bill of Rights’. For comprehensive 
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Northern Ireland the Republic of Ireland pursuant to the Good Friday/Belfast 
Agreement. 
 
1. The Purpose of the ECHR Act 2003 
 
Ireland was an early signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights and, 
indeed, the first state to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights. In the international sphere Ireland was, then, an enthusiastic member of the 
Council of Europe: the community of states that accept the applicability of the 
Convention. Indeed, this remains the case. Within the international sphere Ireland 
consistently reasserts the importance of the Convention, participates in reform 
processes, commits resources to the improvement and further institutional 
development of the Court, and does not have a tendency to protest (or refuse to give 
effect to) adverse judgments from the Court. The domestic approach to the 
Convention has, however, been more mixed. 
 
Given Ireland’s dualist nature3 and the status of the Convention as an international 
treaty, it was to be expected that the impact of the European Convention on Human 
Rights on domestic law would be somewhat minimal until and unless it was 
incorporated by means of legislation. So it proved. Although the Convention had 
some impact in domestic litigation, it was uneven and primarily persuasive and the 
Convention itself was not sufficient to establish any legal wrongs requiring 
remediation in domestic law.
4
 Of course, there were calls for the Convention to be 
incorporated and numerous different models presented themselves.
5
 In general these 
proposals for incorporation, although differing in scope and form, were based on the 
claim that incorporation would further the effective enjoyment of Convention rights 
by allowing for them to be vindicated at the domestic level without recourse to the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg always being necessary. However, 
none of these calls for incorporation actually crystallised into legal change. 
 
                                                 
3
 Article 29.6, Bunreacht na hÉireann. 
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In fact it was not until a commitment to incorporation was included in the Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement (which included core commitments to equivalence of rights 
protections)
6
 that any firm commitment to give effect to the Convention in domestic 
law crystallised into action, and even then the Act was not passed until some years 
after the Agreement itself. 
 
Another important development was the passage in the United Kingdom of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. As outlined further below, the constitutional structures and 
incentives for transposing the Convention were significantly different in both 
jurisdictions, and in Ireland there was no equivalent of Bringing Rights Home
7
 (in 
which the Labour Party set out the centrality of human rights to its 1997 Manifesto) or 
Rights Brought Home
8
 (published with the Human Rights Bill 1997) to outline the 
rationale for Convention-related legislation. However, the Explanatory Memorandum 
to what was then the ECHR Bill 2001 stated that  
 
The provisions in the Bill will alter the current position fundamentally. It is designed to 
facilitate the bringing of cases involving alleged breaches of rights under the Convention in 
Irish courts. In other words, it will make rights under the Convention enforceable in Irish 
courts, and this means that cases of this type will be able to be processed much more 
expeditiously than under the present arrangements.
9
 
 
Mention of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement commitment is also made in the 
memorandum.
10
 This Memorandum outlines that the purpose of the Bill—and 
subsequently the Act—was to enhance effective enjoyment of Convention rights at 
the domestic level, with a particular focus on litigation. What was not intended was 
the fundamental reshaping of legal conceptions and understandings of rights such as 
in the UK. In Ireland, then, the objectives the transposition of the Convention were, 
understandably, substantially more modest. Ireland already had a well developed body 
of constitutionally protected rights; the Convention rights to be transposed via the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 were to complement, rather than 
supplement, this. Even bearing that in mind, we cannot assume that the Act was 
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introduced without an intended practical impact and so—taking the Explanatory 
Memorandum outlined above as a starting point and broadening it out by implication 
from the structure of the Act itself—we can assume that the purpose of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 was, essentially, the domestication of the 
Convention in Ireland. 
  
2. The Structure of the ECHR Act 2003 
 
The structure of the ECHR Act 2003 owes more than a little to the Human Rights Act 
1998 although there are important differences in detail. In a broad sense the Act has 
three main elements: judicial interpretation, rights-compliant performance of 
functions, and the Declaration of Incompatibility. In this way the Act involves all of 
the organs of the state—the judiciary, legislature, executive (in particular in its role 
within the legislature), and the bureaucracy of the state (such as local government and 
government departments)—in its scheme. 
 
Section 2 places an obligation on Courts to ensure that statutes and other laws are 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Ireland’s obligations under the Convention to 
the extent possible. Section 3 creates a performative obligation, requiring bodies 
undertaking state work
11
 to do so in a manner that is compatible with Ireland’s 
Convention-based obligations. Finally, where a statute cannot be interpreted in a 
manner that makes it Convention compatible and no other remedy is available and 
appropriate,
12
 Irish courts may make a Declaration of Incompatibility under s. 5. 
Where such a Declaration is made the law in question remains in force
13
 and the baton 
passes to the Oireachtas to decide on whether, and if so how, to remedy the 
inconsistency that has been identified. 
 
It is quite clear that these provisions are supposed to relate to one another; to act in 
concert in order to maximise the effective domestication of the Convention and, as a 
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result, effective enjoyment at domestic level of rights emanating from that instrument. 
So the scheme of the Act suggests that, in going about their work, organs of the state 
should ensure that (inasmuch as possible) they interpret relevant legal frameworks in 
a manner compliant with the Convention and act accordingly; people who consider 
that their rights are not being upheld can challenge that through litigation in the course 
of which the Court ought to interpret the law in accordance with the Convention 
(again inasmuch as possible) and give effect to it accordingly. If the statute in 
question cannot be interpreted in a Convention-compliant manner and no other 
appropriate remedy is available a Declaration of Incompatibility ought to be issued by 
a Court and subsequently laid before the Dáil leading, ideally, to parliamentary 
discussion as to whether (and if so how) to amend the law in order to achieve 
Convention compliance. On the face of it, then, the Act creates a multi-party scheme 
to secure Convention rights domestically. 
  
3. The ECHR Act 2003 and ‘Domestication’ of the Convention 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum cited above suggests that, in terms of domestication, 
the ECHR Act 2003 was firmly focused on litigation, but the inclusion of the 
performative obligation in s. 3 and the Declaration of Incompatibility in s. 5 lend 
domestication a broader sense inasmuch they suggest that the Convention was not 
only to be used as an interpretive tool in litigation, but rather to inform everyday 
practice by all entities acting in some way on behalf of or under the authority of the 
state. Broadly understood there are four ways in which the Act seems to foresee the 
domestication of the Convention: interpretation, performance, development of an 
autonomous understanding of the Convention within Irish legal practice, and political 
practice. We can assess how successful it has been under each of those headings. 
 
i. Interpretation 
 
Section 2(1) of the ECHR Act 2003 provides 
 
In interpreting and applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court 
shall, in so far as is possible, subject to the rules of law relating to such 
interpretation and application, do so in a manner compatible with the State's 
obligations under the Convention provisions. 
 
This interpretive provision is the main way in which the Convention standards are to 
be effectively folded into domestic law. A step up from the pre-existent presumption 
of compliance with the Convention that had long influenced statutory interpretation in 
Ireland,
14
 s. 2 places a statutory obligation on Courts to find a Convention-compatible 
interpretation of statute and common law to the extent possible. This seems like a 
sensible approach to domestication, and indeed it is very similar to the approach taken 
in the United Kingdom
15
 which has been central to developing a practice of expansive 
interpretation of statute in order to ensure Convention-compliance where possible.
16
 
In Ireland, however, s. 2 seems not have shown its teeth.  
 
In her contribution to this volume, Cliona Kelly notes that s. 2 suffers from poor 
drafting, sometimes inaccurate deployment by litigants, and a restrictive interpretation 
by the Courts.
17
 The latter of these is especially interesting here, because it arguably 
arises alongside rather than because of the former two (well made) observations; it is, 
as Kelly puts it, a matter of how courts ‘frame’ the task of interpretation rather than of 
legislative design per se.
18
 
 
In the first place, although the Act requires all laws to be interpreted in a manner that 
is Convention-compatible to the extent possible, the approach of the Irish courts has 
tended to be to apply ‘ordinary’ rules of interpretation first, and s. 2 later, with the 
first—non-Convention-cognisant—interpretation being considered the “proper”19 or 
“correct”20 one. As Kelly outlines in her chapter, this clearly limits the transformative 
potential of s. 2, as the antecedent interpretation is presumptively correct setting the 
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 Section 3, Human Rights Act 1998. 
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 Dublin City Council v Gallagher Unreported, High Court, 11 November 2008. 
bar for acceptance of an alternative, Convention-compliant interpretation very high 
indeed.
21
  
 
One might expect that this is especially so in situations where an acceptance of such 
an alternative, Convention-compliant interpretation effectively requires words to be 
‘read into’ the statute in question; an exercise that Courts are understandably 
somewhat reluctant to engage in. That reluctance ought not to be attributed to an 
aversion to rights, or to Convention rights more specifically, but rather to an acute 
awareness of the limits of judicial competence. Although s. 2 licences such 
interpretation—or at least appears to—it also limits it by both possibility and “the 
rules of law relating to such interpretation and application”. Where the limit of 
judicial interpretive possibility lies is always, and perhaps inevitably, a matter of 
controversy and in leaving it to the Courts to decide on its location s. 2 is unhelpfully 
vague. However, it is also important to acknowledge that s. 2 can be read in a 
licensing rather than a limiting manner, and an interpretation of any particular 
provision that is considered to go beyond judicial interpretation and wander into the 
realm of judicial law-making can always be ‘remedied’ by an amending Act of the 
Oireachtas. 
 
So far, however, s. 2 has not led to a wholesale rejuvenation of the statute book to 
resolve those (admittedly seemingly limited) situations in which the current legislative 
position is constitutionally-acceptable but contravenes the Convention. This is not 
because such an interpretation is not possible: contrast, for example, the decision of 
the UK Supreme Court in Pinnock
22
 reading discretion into the provision for 
expedited removal from public housing following a long dialogue between London 
and Strasbourg on the issue,
23
 with the issuance of Declarations of Incompatibility 
rather than interpretations upwards in respect of equivalent provisions in Ireland.
24
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ii. Performance 
 
As mentioned above, one of the elements of the European Convention on Human 
Rights Act is a performative obligation contained in section 3(1), which provides: 
 
Subject to any statutory provision (other than this Act) or rule of law, every organ 
of the State shall perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State's 
obligations under the Convention provisions. 
 
This provision contains within it a clear tension: on the one hand all organs of the 
State are required to perform their functions in a Convention-compliant manner, but 
on the other that obligation is subject to statutory provisions so that an incompatible 
statutory provision is to be executed even if it is incompatible with the Convention 
and where it has not been interpreted into Convention compliance by a Court. We 
have already seen how challenging it is to get a provision interpreted up into 
Convention compliance under s. 2, but if we leave that to one side and imagine the 
position of an organ of state in respect of the s. 3(1) obligation a number of particular 
questions arise in respect of the effective domestication that this performative 
obligation might bring about. 
 
The clear implication of s. 3(1) is that in the absence of a judicial interpretation all 
entities that fall within the definition of “organ of state” ought to consider their 
statutory obligations, consider their compliance with the Convention, and then decide 
whether any changes in practice are required. This, of course, would be an enormous 
undertaking and the logistical and resource implications cannot be understated, 
however such labour seems part and parcel of expressly imposing such a performative 
obligation on these entities.  
 
There is however little evidence that this has been done within the relevant organs of 
state in Ireland. Although some training has been provided under the auspices of 
organisations such as the Irish Human Rights Commission, it is not at all clear that 
this kind of systemic review and reform of practice has been resourced or engaged in. 
In some ways this is, perhaps, unsurprising. Firstly we must note that the introduction 
of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 did not bring with it anything 
like the amount of resourcing, training and education that the introduction of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 did in the United Kingdom.  
 
This is partially explicable by the fact that organs of the state in Ireland were already 
accustomed to operating within legal boundaries defined by rights inasmuch as they 
acted in accordance with the Constitution, but it is nevertheless worth mentioning. A 
second important factor is that there are actually very few incentives (beyond a desire 
to act in compliance with the Act) to state organs to take this kind of initiative built 
into the act: the performative obligation is expressly made “subject to any statutory 
provision” other than the 2003 Act, so that it is a defence to be acting in pursuance of 
a statutory provision. Certainly, a relevant statute may be ‘interpreted up’ to make it 
Convention-compliant, but as we have seen above that is rarely the case in Ireland, so 
that the ‘normal’ interpretation of the statute is likely to persist and organs of state can 
simply continue to act as they did before the Act was introduced.  
 
If the statute in question is considered to be incapable of a Convention-compliant 
interpretation under s. 2 a Declaration of Incompatibility may be issued under s. 5 but 
the legislation in question, of course, remains in force
25
 until and unless it is amended 
by the Oireachtas so that organs of the state must continue to apply it. Even more 
distincentivising, individuals in relation to whom it is applied must make fresh 
applications and seek further Declarations of Incompatibility if they want to obstruct 
the operation of the relevant statute upon them.  
 
Organs of state are thus simultaneously placed under a performative obligation and 
effectively released by said obligation by the construction of the statutory provision 
itself: a situation that is hardly conducive to substantive change in practice. 
 
iii. Developing an Autonomous Understanding of the Convention 
 
One of the key challenges in the domestication of any international instrument lies in 
developing an autonomous domestic understanding of the standards that the 
instrument contains, without undermining or undoing the work of the treaty-
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 Section 5(2), European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 
enforcement mechanisms themselves. Developing such an understanding is not 
inconsistent with the idea of an international instrument; indeed, it is arguably central 
to such an instrument’s healthy evolution not only because it entrenches standards at 
the domestic level but also because it aids in the management of treaty mechanisms’ 
workload. In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights it is quite 
clear that the Court wishes to see domestic legal systems develop their own systems 
around the Convention subject to an acceptance that the ultimate interpretative power 
in respect of the Convention rests with the Court, and that the standards as it outlines 
them are the minimum common standards to be applied across the Council of 
Europe.
26
   
 
The wording of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 suggests that it 
was not beyond the contemplation of the drafters that the Irish judiciary might 
develop its own understandings of the Convention’s meaning within the context of the 
Act. While the courts are instructed to take account of Strasbourg jurisprudence,
27
 
they are expressly not bound by that jurisprudence. This leaves scope—at least on a 
literal reading—for the development of Convention standards as contained within the 
Schedule to the Act in their domestic setting. It even suggests that Irish courts might 
be entitled as a matter of domestic law to depart from Strasbourg jurisprudence in 
order to give effect to what might be considered a ‘lower’ level of protection than the 
European Court of Human Rights has declared.  
 
In this, the Act clearly shadows the equivalent provision in the Human Rights Act 
1998.
28
 In both the UK and Ireland, however, there has to date been somewhat of a 
reluctance to fully embrace this jurisdiction, with courts in the UK instead taking what 
has come to be termed as the ‘mirror principle’ approach and Irish courts seeming to 
follow suit.  
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This approach, which is often traced back to Lord Bingham’s speech in Ullah,29 
suggests that the Convention-based rights in the Human Rights Act 1998 ought to be 
interpreted in a manner that ‘mirrors’ the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the 
relevant Article. This has so far been developed in a way that suggests that the UK 
courts will only exceptionally depart ‘downwards’ from a decision of the Strasbourg 
Court and will usually follow the Strasbourg jurisprudence. However, in the UK the 
status of the mirror principle is now in serious question.  
 
As Roger Masterman has written, more and more ‘exceptions’ in which a departure 
from Strasbourg is permitted are being developed,
30
 and indeed there are (albeit rare) 
cases in which domestic courts are going beyond Strasbourg and prepared to develop 
the rights protected under the Human Rights Act 1998 to a greater degree.
31
 On a 
straightforward reading of the Human Rights Act 1998 this seems entirely reasonable 
and, indeed, appropriate. Such an approach does of course attract some criticism, 
much (although not all) of which can be traced in some ways back to the relatively 
limited traditional role of the judiciary in the United Kingdom. The Irish judiciary has 
not traditionally been so limited.  
 
As is well known, the separation of powers has been institutionally entrenched in 
Ireland since Bunreacht na hÉireann and we are quite accustomed to courts holding 
substantial interpretive powers. Thus, the same socio-cultural reasons for acting as if 
bound by a mirror principle arguably do not arise in Ireland as do in the United 
Kingdom. Notwithstanding that, however, Irish courts have embraced the Ullah 
principle in a fairly whole-hearted way and seem extremely reluctant to develop an 
autonomous meaning of Convention rights as protected by the European Convention 
on Human Rights Act 2003 that depart from the Strasbourg jurisprudence.  
 
Although not bound by the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence as a 
matter of law, there are hints that Irish courts might consider themselves to be 
effectively limited by that jurisprudence. The strongest indication of this undoubtedly 
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arises in McD v L.
32
 Although the attempt in this case to plead the Convention as if it 
were directly applicable, rather than clearly through the prism of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, was problematic it is worthwhile noticing the 
clear implication (made express in the judgment of Fennelly J.) that the Court could 
not outpace Strasbourg in interpreting the Convention.
33
 Such a position unnecessarily 
holds Irish courts back and, by extension, limits the flourishing of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 
 
There is nothing whatsoever in the terms of the 2003 Act or, indeed, in the 
Convention that suggests that the domestic understanding of the Convention cannot 
go beyond the Strasbourg interpretation; indeed, the margin of appreciation arguably 
militates against such a limited vision of the role of domestic courts. We are 
accustomed to speaking of the margin of appreciation as allowing member states to 
limit the enjoyment of rights or to take a more restrictive approach than, perhaps, the 
Convention might accommodate or other European states might favour but of course 
the margin is not uniquely negative. It exists, rather, to acknowledge legitimate 
differences across member states (subject, always, to giving effect to a common 
minimum standard). 
 
iv. Political Practice 
 
Successful integration of the Convention in domestic rights-related discourses 
requires it to become woven into political practice so that it becomes a relevant 
talking point—whether invoked in a positive way or not—in domestic legislative and 
policy debates. Although the Convention suffers from some notably bad press in that 
jurisdiction, the United Kingdom has designed up a system—through its Human 
Rights Act 1998 and subsequent practice—in which the Convention is an almost 
unavoidable element of rights-related public discourse whether in parliament, in the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, or in the media. This is partially explicable by the 
fact that, through the prism of the Human Rights Act, the Convention effectively 
provides the basis for rights-based protections in the UK. The same is not, of course, 
true of Ireland where the Constitution provides that basic floor of protection.  
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 McD v L [2009] IESC 81 at paras 104–105. 
 Even bearing that in mind, however, one could hardly claim that the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 had mainstreamed the Convention in 
contemporary political processes. First, there is no requirement to certify that a 
proposed Bill is compliant with the Convention (unlike in the Human Rights Act 
1998
34
). Furthermore, while there is now some pre-legislative scrutiny within the 
Oireachtas, committees remain divided by area or specialism and there is no dedicated 
committee for rights-related pre- and post-legislative scrutiny comparable to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights. Finally, Declarations of Incompatibility—designed to 
empower parliamentary debate around rights in what has become known as a model 
of ‘commonwealth constitutionalism’35 and transplanted from the Human Rights Act 
1998—are ill-designed for this jurisdiction and have been distinctly underwhelming in 
their effects.
36
  
 
This is not to say that the Convention does not play a part in parliamentary debate, but 
it is difficult to see how this role has significantly advanced from that which it always 
played, i.e. as either a tangential consideration or the primary nudge (by means of an 
adverse judgment in respect of Ireland) for substantive and responsive legal change.  
 
At the political level, it is frankly difficult to clearly identify what difference the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 has made to effective rights 
protection. 
 
4. The ECHR Act 2003: Ambitions Fulfilled? 
 
From what I have already written in this short essay, it should be clear that I do not 
consider the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 to be a resounding 
success (or anything like it) when it comes to the domestic enjoyment of rights that 
emanate from the European Convention on Human Rights. This is not to say that 
there is no potential for the Act to be more successful in the future. Indeed, one can 
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 Discussed at greater length in Fiona de Londras, “Declarations of Incompatibility under the ECHR 
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imagine a number of relatively straight-forward changes that might have significant 
impact. 
 
First, at the structural level, the relatively recent commitment to pre-legislative 
scrutiny should be further developed to include a standard pre-legislative scrutiny of 
Bills for compliance with the Convention taking into account not only Ireland’s 
international commitments but also the commitment—implicit within the Act—that 
legislation would be given effect in a manner that is Convention-compliant to the 
extent possible. The primary responsibility for ensuring that legislation is compliant 
with the ECHR clearly lies with the political branches of government: the Executive 
and the Legislature. A discussion as to that compliance should, therefore, self-
evidently take place within the deliberative political process including during pre-
legislative scrutiny when a collaborative process between parliamentarians, 
government ministers, the office of the Attorney General, and those who contribute to 
consultations (including academics and practitioners and the Irish Human Rights 
Commission) can fully air Convention-related matters. This does not require any 
amendment to the Act, although a requirement that the relevant Minister expressly 
state whether or not the proposed legislation complies with the Convention would be 
welcome.
37
 Instead, it requires a change in political practice alongside and as part of a 
change in political mindset. The current period of substantial political reform—
including especially in relation to the role and scope of Oireachtas committees—
would seem an opportune time to introduce such change. 
 
A further reform at the political level relates to the practice around Declarations of 
Incompatibility. These Declarations are, as I have written both above and elsewhere,
38
 
designed precisely to instigate contestation around rights. They do not require 
legislative reform in order to ensure Convention-compliance, but they do require a 
discussion around the desirability or otherwise of such reform. Where the state 
continues to apply legislation that has been the subject of a Declaration of 
Incompatibility that should result from a rigorous and concerted debate at the political 
level about whether or not maintaining the status quo is desirable. However, at 
present Declarations of Incompatibility (while relatively rare) have not attracted the 
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level of political attention and political pressure that their structure and rationale 
suggests they ought to. Changing this is a matter of political commitment. The 
Declaration of Incompatibility fits awkwardly within a legal constitutionalist system 
such as Ireland’s, but this does not mean that it cannot be an effective instrument 
provided appropriate political commitment is present.  
 
Moving beyond political structures, organs of the state ought to undertake 
comprehensive reviews of their compliance with the Convention by reference to s. 3. 
This requires two stages. The first is the accurate identification of organs of state to 
which s. 3 applies. As Cliona Kelly and I have previously argued,
39
 a literal 
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 suggests that 
the category of “organ of state” is remarkably broad and may in fact capture a large 
number of organisations and institutions that do not consider themselves as ‘state’ 
entities in quotidian terms. The second stage would be a substantive review by which 
the organs of state assess, to the best of their judgement, the extent to which they are 
currently interpreting statutes and adjust their processes and procedures accordingly. 
Of course, this would be a resource-intensive exercise and it may be that the burden 
could be shared across agencies and institutions, however it seems unlikely that the 
performative obligation under s. 3 will be meaningful without such a review. 
 
Finally, a more robust approach to the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003 by Irish courts would be welcome both in terms of a “re-framing” of the 
interpretive process under s. 2 (to borrow Kelly’s phrase40) and a willingness to 
develop an autonomous understanding of the rights protected through the prism of the 
Act and emanating from the Convention. As outlined above, such robustness is not 
only permitted but arguably foreseen by the Act and may also invigorate the political 
engagement with the Convention and the Act by instigating effective dialogue in this 
respect between the judiciary, the Oireachtas and the Executive. 
 
5. Equivalence with Northern Ireland 
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As mentioned in the early stages of this essay, commitments on human rights were a 
core part of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. These included not only substantive 
commitments to respect and vindicate rights by both governments and in Northern 
Ireland, but also institutional commitments to establish national human rights 
institutions and explore further rights instruments such as the controversy-laden 
Northern Irish Bill of Rights and seemingly-forgotten Charter of Rights for the Island 
of Ireland.
41
  
 
The United Kingdom was well on the way to incorporating the Convention by the 
time that the Agreement was concluded; indeed, as noted above, doing so had been a 
central plank of New Labour’s vision for the United Kingdom. The commitment 
contained in the Good Friday Agreement in that respect was, then, a restatement of 
pre-existing political will as well as an assurance of kinds that devolution would not 
detrimentally effect the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 in Northern 
Ireland. The decision to incorporate in the United Kingdom was part of a 
comprehensive system of constitutional reform that included but was not limited to 
devolution, the establishment of the UK Supreme Court, reform of the House of Lords 
and empowerment of the judicial branch in respect of individual rights all of which 
substantially shifted the contours of (or, some argue, undid the character of) the 
United Kingdom’s political constitution.42  
 
The constitutional format and status of rights in Ireland was not comparable to that in 
the United Kingdom at the time. Since 1937 there had been a constitutionally 
entrenched protection of fundamental rights, an independent judiciary with a strike 
down power, and a robust—if imperfect—political engagement with rights as 
domestic legal instruments. The same incentives for incorporating the Convention did 
not, then, exist in Ireland as did in the United Kingdom, but Ireland nevertheless 
committed to equivalence in rights protection in Chapter 6 of the Agreement. It may 
be that this, ultimately, provided the incentive for transposition of the Convention in 
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Ireland and explains the close relationship between the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. If that is the case, a somewhat 
cynical (or perhaps merely realistic) reading of the introduction of the 2003 Act is that 
its purpose was, merely, to create formal equivalence between the two jurisdictions on 
the island of Ireland.  
 
Following the introduction of the Act both jurisdictions had a statutorily framed 
transposition of the Convention that incorporated interpretive (judicial), performative 
(public authority (s. 6, Human Rights Act 1998)/organs of state), and political 
elements. As long as that basic framework remains in place, and regardless of the 
effectiveness of the 2003 Act in actually protecting individual rights emanating from 
the Convention, it may be that in a minimalistic sense the European Convention on 
Human Rights Act 2003 has fulfilled its function and equivalence is established.  
 
Of course, delving beneath that superficial reading one discovers a host of in-
equivalences. Irish judges’ colleagues on the benches of Northern Ireland (not to 
mention the Northern Irish judge in the UK Supreme Court) can hardly feel that their 
engagement with the Convention is equivalent to that of judges in the Republic; nor 
are local authorities in Northern Ireland likely to recognise as equivalent the extent to 
which their counterparts in the Republic have had their ways of working transformed 
(or not) by the performative obligation. Not even politicians can consider that the 
impact of the Acts has been equivalent, particularly bearing in mind the fact that 
devolved legislation can be struck down for incompatibility under the Human Rights 
Act 1998.  
 
Assessed by reference to both the domestication of the Convention and the 
achievement of equivalence with Northern Ireland, it is difficult to tell a particularly 
optimistic story of the effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Act 2003. Introduced with neither herald nor fanfare, the Act’s impact has been 
limited, but its potential is not. The next decade of its operation may yet bring a 
deeper entrenchment and fuller embrace of the Act.  
